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NOTES
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY IN FEDERAL COURT: Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.
Doctrines of official immunity insulate state and federal executive,
legislative, and judicial officers from judicial proceedings arising out of
their performance of official duties.' These doctrines of official immu-
nity have both explicit 2 and implicit3 constitutional bases. Although the
past decade has witnessed some erosion of the scope of executive and
legislative immunity, 4 this trend has not produced a coherent principle
for deciding immunity claims.5 In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc. ,6 the Supreme Court held that the doctrine
of legislative immunity bars a federal court from issuing an injunction
against state court judges for promulgating rules regulating attorney
conduct, but it failed to provide definitive standards for approaching
claims of official immunity.
The Court's reasoning in Consumers Union may support several ex-
tensions of official immunity. The decision suggests that state legislators
enjoy some measure of immunity from federal court injunctions. 7 It
might also provide state court judges with immunity from federal court
injunctions relating to their adjudicatory functions.8 Finally, the deci-
I Official immunity does not bar a claimant from filing a claim in federal court. It
does, however, allow the official to obtain a dismissal of the charges at an early stage in the
proceedings. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976).
2 The Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution provides: "[F]or any Speech or
Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
Place." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
3 The doctrines of separation of powers and federalism require a grant of official immu-
nity. See note 15 and accompanying text in/5a.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980) and notes 58-64 and accompa-
nying text inj/a; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) and notes 101-03 and accompanying
text in/ra; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) and notes 90-97 and accompanying text
in/ra; United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) and note 41 and accompanying text
infra. See generaly Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Oi-
cialsfor Damages, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 281, 284-85.
5 Recent official immunity cases do not present consistent standards or methodologies
for evaluating official immunity claims. Typically, the Supreme Court cites previous official
immunity cases for the proposition that liability would threaten the independence of the
defendant governmental body. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text in/ra. The Court then
determines whether the interests involved in the instant case require a grant of immunity.
The Court generally presents its determination as a bare conclusion, usually granting the
defendant officials immunity, but occasionally withholding it.
6 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
7 See notes 135-54 and accompanying text in/a.
8 See notes 155-65 and accompanying text in/a.
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sion might provide to state and federal executive officials charged with
rulemaking responsibilities immunity from claims brought against them
in federal court.9 Proper consideration of the constitutional basis of offi-
cial immunity,10 however, supports a narrow reading of the Court's
decision.
I
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
A. Rationale for Ojficial Immunity
The goal of providing redress for violations of constitutiona- rights
creates a presumption in favor of official liability.II The federal courts
are restrained, however, in cases involving state or federal officials; the
Constitution sets out structural arrangements requiring some degree of
official immunity12 to prevent the federal judiciary from interfering with
9 See notes 166-69 and accompanying text infra.
10 This Note discusses the sources of official immunity almost exclusively in constitu-
tional terms. Although the Supreme Court has relied on common law principles in sustaining
claims of official immunity, see Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) and notes 76-
81 and accompanying text in/a; see generally Nagel, Judicial Immunity and Sovereigny, 6 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 237, 245 n.43 (1978), most cases treat official immunity as an issue of
statutory construction under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), because this Act
provides the statutory authority for official liability. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) and notes 46-52 and accompanying text
in/ta.
Notwithstanding the reliance on statutory and common law principles in official immu-
nity cases, discussion of official immunity in constitutional terms is not inappropriate. All
justifications for official immunity involve, at their core, judicial interference with the activi-
ties of other governmental entities. Neither the Civil Rights Act nor the common law pro-
vides any readily ascertainable standards for determining the propriety of judicial action. In
contrast, the constitutional doctrines of federalism and separation of powers provide relatively
clear standards for making this determination. See notes 20-26 and accompanying text in/a.
Incorporation of the constitutional doctrines provides a clearer statement of the parameters of
official immunity than do the inconclusive legislative history of the Civil Rights Act or judi-
cial pronouncements of common law. Under this view, the continued reference to official
immunity as a question of statutory construction should be interpreted as an implied recogni-
tion of the principle that courts should avoid constitutional issues wherever possible. See Ash-
wander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (" '[I]t
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute
is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question will be avoided,' Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 62.").
11 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,485-86 (1978) (complaint alleging constitutional
rights violations by federal officials states a cause of action compensable in damages); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390-97 (1971)
(same); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[I]t is established practice for this Court to
sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by
the Constitution . . . . [F]ederal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done.") (footnotes omitted); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)
("The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.').
12 Significantly, the Constitution does not specify the extent of immunity necessary to
preserve its structures. Until recently, the Court considered absolute immunity the only alter-
1981)
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the operation of other state and federal governmental bodies.' 3 In bal-
ancing these conflicting interests, a federal court considering a claim of
official immunity must engage in a two-tiered inquiry. On the first tier,
the court must determine the level of interference with the operation of
other governmental bodies that a holding of liability will cause. On the
second tier, the court must determine whether the Constitution permits
that level of interference. Under the first-tier analysis, similar considera-
tions apply to claims against state and federal officials.14 On the second
tier, however, the distinction between federalism analysis and separation
of powers analysis suggests differences between the scope of immunity
for state and federal officials. 15
native to official liability. In the past decade, however, it has adopted qualified immunity, see
note 97 and accompanying text inJra, as another alternative. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478 (1978) and notes 98, 101-03 and accompanying text infia; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232 (1974) and notes 90-97 and accompanying text inra. This development, which can-
not be viewed as constitutionally compelled, has created the possibility of a range of
immunities.
13 The Constitution assigns a limited role to the federal judiciary in the governmental
structure-that of determining the law. The judicial power does not extend to controlling the
official conduct of the coordinate branches of the federal government. See notes 20-22 and
accompanying text infla. Different concerns limit the federal judiciary's power with respect to
the states. In this area, the limits on the power of the federal government and the federal
judiciary operate to preserve the sovereignty of the states. See notes 23-26 and accompanying
text incfa.
Professor Weinberg has articulated the fundamental structural problem associated with
federal court enforcement of constitutional prohibitions against state officials. See Weinberg,
The NewJudital Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1191, 1197-1205 (1977). The states must ad-
minister their affairs within the bounds of the Constitution. At the same time, respect for the
states' position in the federal structure requires federal courts to recognize the states' capacity
to protect constitutional rights. These two postulates of American constitutionalism come
into conflict when a federal court is called upon to adjudicate a claim against a state for a
violation of constitutional rights. In an earlier era, concern with the abuse of the federal
courts' equitable jurisdiction over the states led to the adoption of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), and the eleventh amendment. Professor Weinberg argues that "the
Civil War settled the fundamental constitutional question whether the Union could impose
national standards upon the states," Weinberg, supra, at 1197-98, and that the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)), gave the
federal courts jurisdiction over claims of state deprivations of civil rights. Weinberg, supra, at
1198. See generally Developments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv.
1133, 1149-53 (1977), arguing that the Reconstruction Congress preferred federal court action
to enforce civil rights.
Civil liability is not the only potential source of conflict between the judiciary and the
other branches; judicial review limits the independence of government officials by limiting
the finality of their decisions. Through judicial review, the courts set restraints within which
officials must act. Where a court exercises its powers of judicial review aggressively, it can
effectively control individual officials' actions. See general4y THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J.
Madison) (Cooke, ed. 1961).
14 This inquiry centers on an issue of fact: the extent of the interference with the offi-
cials' conduct. Because state legislators and members of Congress use similar procedures in
discharging their official responsibilities, they will be similarly affected by judicial interfer-
ence. See generaly Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75 (1951).
15 This inquiry centers on an issue of law: the constitutionally permissible level of judi-
cial interference. On the second tier, the similarity between state and federal officials dis-
[Vol. 67:188
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On the first tier, judicial review of official conduct presents four
considerations that militate in favor of official immunity. First, imposi-
tion of personal liability upon officials duty-bound to perform the acts
giving rise to the claim would deter qualified individuals from entering
government service.16 Second, representative government requires offi-
cial immunity to prevent the threat of personal liability from improp-
erly influencing the decisions of government officials exercising their
discretionary powers. 17 Third, defending against personal liability
claims would distract officials from performing their public duties.18 Fi-
nally, judicial review might disrupt government efforts to conduct offi-
cial business.' 9
On the second tier, the doctrine of separation of powers limits a
federal court's inquiry in suits involving Congress or the executive
solves because the legal consequences of separation of powers analysis and federalism analysis
differ. See notes 20-26 and accompanying text infra.
16 Personal liability may create an uncomfortable dilemma for government officials. See
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), in which Judge Learned Hand stated:
Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be
founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself
hard put. . . to satisfy ajury of his good faith. [Although official misconduct
should be punished, it is] quite another matter [to expose officials who] have
been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors.
Id. at 581. Under such circumstances, many qualified individuals may choose not to enter
government service. This would hinder the ability of governmental bodies to discharge their
duties. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 331 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting in part).
17 In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutor absolutely immune from
damage claim arising under § 1983), the Court stated:
A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in deciding
which suits to bring and in conducting them in court. The public trust of the
prosecutor's office would suffer if he were constrained in making every deci-
sion by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for
damages.
Id. at 424-25. In this manner, official liability impairs the state or federal government's abil-
ity to conduct its affairs through official action. But see Develonpments, supra note 13, at 1202
(arguing that granting absolute immunity to all discretionary decisionmakers "would wholly
and impermissibly undermine the section 1983 damage action.").
18 In Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (members of
Congress immune from suit for injunction brought under § 1983), the Court noted that de-
fense of "a private civil action. . .creates a distraction and forces Members [of Congress] to
divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks ... " Id. at 503. See also
Freed, Executive Oiftial Immunity for Constitutional Violations An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw.
U.L. RE V. 526, 529-30 (1977).
19 The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of preventing judicial interfer-
ence with the conduct of other governmental bodies. In Eastland v. United States Service-
men's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 511 (1975), the Court stated:
This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial interference may cause. A
legislative inquiry has been frustrated for nearly five years, during which the
Members.. . have been distracted from the purpose of their inquiry. The
[Speech or Debate] Clause was written to prevent the need to be confronted
by such "questioning. ... "
For a critique of this argument, see The Supreme Court, 1974 Tenn, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 136-39
(1975).
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branch.20 Where a federal court finds a "textually demonstrable consti-
tutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department,"
the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the exercise of federal judi-
cial power.2 1 The exercise of judicial review would amount to judicial
control over a coordinate branch's actions, a condition generally unac-
ceptable under separation of powers doctrine.22
The separation of powers doctrine has no effect upon federal courts'
power in suits involving state officials; 23 rather, the relevant concern is
20 The Supreme Court has addressed this issue in its consideration of the justiciability of
political questions. Justiciability is a threshold issue to be decided before a court addresses
the merits of a particular controversy. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHS-
LER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 240-41 (2d
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; id. at 95-96 (Supp. 1981). See generaly
Scharpf,JudidalReview andthe Political Question: 4 FunctionalAnal ss, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 538-39
(1966); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princbles of Cortitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 9-10
(1959).
21 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The political question doctrine prevents a
court from substituting its own judgment for that of another branch of government. See id. at
210 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939)): "In determining whether a
question falls within [the political question] category, the appropriateness under our system of
government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack
of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations."
Thus, judicial action is inappropriate when an issue arises regarding the propriety of
another branch's judgments. But see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (political
question doctrine does not bar judicial review of Congress's determination of its members'
qualifications). Powell demonstrates the distinction between congressional action and con-
gressional discretion. The political question doctrine applies only where Congress has made a
discretionary judgment. See generaly HART & WEOHSLER, supra note 20, at 234-35.
22 See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (J. Madison) (Cooke ed. 1961):
It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the
departments ought not to be directly and compleatly administered by either
of the other departments.. .[none) ofthem ought to.possess. . . an overrul-
ing influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers.
But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), in which the Court recognized a presi-
dential privilege but held that
when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidential-
ity, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in
the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privi-
lege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial.
Id. at 713. UnitedStates o. Nixon applies only when a court finds a conflict between competing
claims of two branches of government. In this situation, the Court seeks "the least restrictive
means of reconciling the powers of both branches. This [is] accomplished by comparing the
relative degrees of intrusions into the classically defined functions of the competing
branches." Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scofpe of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 661, 698 (197,8). For a detailed overview of the separation of powers theory, see id. at
661-706.
23 "[T]he separation-of-powers principle, like the political-question doctrine, has no ap-
plicability to the federal judiciary's relationship to the States." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
352 (1976). "[I]t is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives
rise to the 'political question."' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). For a contrary view,
see id. at 278-97 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 67:188
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federalism. Like separation of powers analysis, federalism analysis seeks
to limit the disruptive effect of federal court action on other sovereign
governmental bodies. 24 Federalism, however, does not always preclude
federal court disruption of state governmental activity; federal interests
carry great weight.25 Given the federal responsibility for guaranteeing
constitutional rights, interests of comity generally will yield where state
action violates the Constitution.26
In Younger v. Harris,27 the Supreme Court considered the require-
ments of federalism in an area analogous to official immunity-a federal
injunction to prevent violation of a defendant's constitutional rights in a
pending state criminal proceeding.28 In Younger, the defendant alleged
that a pending prosecution threatened his constitutional rights. The
prosecutors responded that an injunction would unjustifiably interfere
with the state's ability to enforce its laws.29 A divided Court determined
that an injunction prohibiting further state court proceedings was im-
proper, holding that "the normal thing to do . . .is not to issue such
24 See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (federal government
may not require payment of minimum wage to state employees because of interference with
state's ability to set its own policy priorities); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal
court generally may not enjoin pending state prosecution because of interference with state's
ability to enforce its own laws).
25 The issues involved in the conflict between federal supremacy and state sovereignty
are discussed in note 13 supra.
26 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) ("[P]rinciples of
federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily over-
ridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments."); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267, 291 (1977) ("The Tenth Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to the States
is not implicated by a federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful
state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Nor are principles of federalism
abrogated. . . 2"); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("We think that the Elev-
enth Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies. . . are necessar-
ily limited by the enforcement provisions of. . .the Fourteenth Amendment."). Segeneralt
P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HowE & E. BROWN, CONSTrruTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
OTHER PROBLEMS 66-68 (4th ed. Supp. 1980).
27 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The defendant Harris had been indicted for violations of a Cali-
fornia statute. He sought a federal injunction barring the state prosecution, arguing that the
underlying statute contravened the first amendment's guarantee of free speech. A three-judge
district court issued the injunction. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 509 (C.D. Cal.
1968). On appeal, a closely divided Supreme Court reversed, dissolving the injunction. 401
U.S. 37 (1971).
28 A federal court injunction against a pending state criminal prosecution poses a threat
to the sovereignty of the state. If a state cannot enforce its own laws, then it has lost a sub-
stantial element of its sovereignty: the ability to regulate "socially harmful conduct that the
State believes in good faith to be punishable." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51-52 (1971).
Similarly, when a federal court controls the actions of state officials, it poses a threat to state
sovereignty by indirectly controlling the activities of the state. Of course, a case involving an
injunction against state criminal prosecutions may be distinguishable from a case involving
an injunction against a state official because of the different identities of the defendants. This
distinction, however, misses the critical issue: the interference with a state's ability to control
its own affairs.
29 Id. at 39-40.
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injunctions. ' '30 Subsequent decisions have reaffirmed this aversion to
federal court injunctive relief,3 1 although the Court has upheld the issu-
ance of injunctions when the defendant has demonstrated a great and
immediate threat of irreparable harm.32 Younger has not compromised
30 Id. at 45. Citing the terms of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), the
Court found a "longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court
proceedings." 401 U.S. at 43. The Court identified concerns of equity, comity, and "Our
Federalism" as the basis of this public policy. Id. at 43-44. The Court stated:
The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more
than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our Na-
tional Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses.
What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which
the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect
federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will
not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Id. at 44. See general.y note 13 supra.
31 The Younger doctrine presents two independent grounds for denying federal court in-
junctive relief against state judicial proceedings: absence of the requisite harm for invoking
the federal court's equitable jurisdiction and impermissible interference with a state judicial
proceeding. In the absence of a pending state proceeding, the federal court still must scruti-
nize the facts to determine whether a substantial threat of great and immediate harm exists.
See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (alleged illegal bond-setting, sentencing,
and jury management practices do not sufficiently affect plaintiffs not subject to pending
criminal prosecution to constitute requisite irreparable injury); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77
(1971) (threat of future prosecution under challenged statute does not sufficiently affect plain-
tiffs not subject to pending criminal prosecution). The Younger doctrine also bars federal
court injunctions against an expanding array of state judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (injunction against pending civil child custody proceeding); Juidice
v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (injunction preventing enforcement of state civil contempt judg-
ment); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (injunction against civil public nuisance
proceeding); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) (suppression order of allegedly illegally
seized evidence to be used in pending state criminal proceeding); Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971) (declaratory and injunctive relief in pending state criminal proceeding). As a
general rule, "Younger is presumptively applicable to any state proceeding in which the state
is seeking to enforce important public policies." HART & WECH-SLER, supra note 20, at 281
(Supp. 1981). See general v id. at 1042-50 (2d ed. 1973), 277-86 (Supp. 1981); Note, Younger
Grows Older: Equitable Abstention in Civil Proceedings, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 877-78 (1975).
32 Younger does not bar a federal court injunction where a constitutional claim cannot
adequately be considered in a state forum. The Supreme Court has found the state forum
inadequate in three situations: (1) where the state action causing the alleged constitutional
violation has taken place without any court proceeding, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
108 n.9 (1975) (federal court may grant declaratory and injunctive relief to require states to
conduct a hearing on issue of probable cause in which constitutional claims may be raised);
(2) where the members of the state tribunal have a personal interest in the resolution of the
constitutional claim, see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (members' pecuniary inter-
est in outcome renders state forum inadequate). But see Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117
(1975) (injunctive relief unavailable where one member of state supreme court involved in
alleged constitutional violation); (3) where the threat of state prosecution exists and the plain-
tiff can show a substantial threat of great and immediate harm, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977) (plaintiff threatened with criminal prosecution may challenge underlying
statute before state institutes criminal proceeding); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
930-31 (1975). But see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (federal injunction barred
where state institutes criminal proceeding after filing of federal action but before federal ac-
tion has progressed substantially). See generaly Developments, supra note 13, at 1287-92.
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the federal guarantee of constitutional rights, but has removed the guar-
antee of a federal court forum for the vindication of such rights. 33
B. Scope of Odfcial Immunity
Concern for the Constitution's inter- and intragovernmental struc-
tures has prompted the development of official immunity. Distinctions
arise among the immunities extending to executive, legislative, and judi-
cial officials because of the different functions and institutional arrange-
ments of their respective offices.34 Other distinctions exist between the
immunity extending to state and federal officers, and the immunity
granted in response to different types of judicial action.3 5
33 Younger is a jurisdictional, not a substantive, doctrine. It does not allow state officials
to violate constitutional rights with impunity; rather, it changes the forum in which the claim
is litigated. A plaintiff is required to raise a claim of unconstitutional state action in a pend-
ing state proceeding, not in a collateral federal court action. The state court is presumed
competent to adjudicate the constitutional claim. A federal court, however, will intervene
upon a showing of inadequacy in the state court proceeding. See generally Monaghan, The
Burger Court and "Our Federalism," 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 44-46 (1980).
In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), the Supreme Court asserted that the principles
of federalism underlying the Younger doctrine barred a federal judge from issuing an order
requiring elected city officials to prepare a program for dealing with civilian complaints of
police misconduct. Citing a number of Younger doctrine cases, the Court emphasized the
limitations upon federal courts' equitable powers over state officials. The Court concluded
that the federal courts should limit their interference with the internal affairs of local govern-
mental bodies. Id. at 377-81. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (fed-
eral court remedial order for school desegregation must respect independent authority of local
officials over administration of routine matters).
Rizzo represents a novel extension of the principles enunciated in Younger and its progeny.
Unlike Younger, Rizzo contains a substantive element that limits the protection of constitu-
tional rights. Given a situation in which a federal court would exercise jurisdiction to redress
a constitutional violation under Younger, Rizzo raises another barrier to the vindication of
constitutional rights by requiring a federal court to respect the authority of local officials in
fashioning its remedy for a constitutional violation. See general/ HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 20, at 284 (Supp. 1981).
This Note relies on the jurisdictional rather than the substantive components of the
Younger doctrine. Although the Younger doctrine militates against the exercise of federal equi-
table jurisdiction over state officials, it does not limit a federal court's authority to fashion a
remedy for a constitutional violation after the court determines that federal jurisdiction
should be exercised.
34 While not articulating any basis for their distinctions, the courts traditionally have
distinguished the degree of immunity granted to various types of government officials. Some
tendencies, however, are clear. The courts never have given much consideration to suits
against judges. Claims against executive officials have met with considerably more success
and claims against legislators have occupied an intermediate position.
The reasons for these distinctions remain unclear. Because improper interference with
the conduct of other government officials remains the basis for all immunity doctrines, the
susceptibility of the various officials to influence caused by judicial review is apparently the
principal variable.
35 Judicial action may take the form of criminal prosecutions, civil actions for damages,
or suits for injunctive or declaratory relief. Presumably, criminal prosecutions present the
greatest threat of interference. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text infla (Speech or.De-
bate Clause developed as a response to the threat of criminal prosecution). But see United
States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980) (finding little justification for granting immunity from
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1. Legislative Immunity
The Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution 36 provides mem-
bers of Congress with virtually absolute immunity from liability for
claims arising from their legislative activities. In light of the history of
legislative intimidation by the Stuart monarchs, 37 the Founding Fathers
adopted this absolute immunity to preserve Congress's position in the
power structure.38 In its initial interpretation of the Clause, the
Supreme Court extended congressional immunity from damage claims
"to things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members
in relation to the business before it."'39 This application emphasizes the
Clause's role in preserving the independence of legislative processes.4
prosecution under a federal criminal statute). The Supreme Court views damage claims as
the next greatest threat of interference, followed by injunctions. Compare Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (members of Congress absolutely immune from damage action) and
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (Court has more difficulty
finding members of Congress absolutely immune from injunctive relief) with Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state executive officials have qualified immunity from dam-
ages), andExparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (state executive officials subject to federal court
injunctions). Rejecting state legislative immunity from injunctions while granting it for dam-
age actions might be criticized because an injunction acts as an absolute bar to official activ-
ity whereas damages act only as a deterrent. But see Schuck, supra note 4, at 281 n.1. The
Court may find that declaratory relief poses a less substantial threat of interference than
injunctive relief. Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (declaratory relief distin-
guished from injunctive relief under Younger doctrine because such federal relief would not
interfere with state action in progress).
36 "[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not
be questioned in any other Place." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
37 Legislative privilege developed out of the seventeenth century conflict over primacy
between the King and Parliament. During this period, the King systematically harassed
prominent members of Parliament by instituting criminal prosecutions based on their legisla-
tive acts. For an excellent treatment of this subject, see Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative
Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1113, 1122-35 (1973).
38 James Wilson, in an oft-quoted passage, stated:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick to discharge
his publick trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that
he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected
from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offence.
1 WORKS OF JAMEs WILSON 421 (McCloskey ed. 1967). The Supreme Court has viewed the
Speech or Debate Clause as serving "to prevent intimidation [of members of Congress] by the
executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 169, 181 (1965). See United States v. Helstosld, 442 U.S. 477, 491 (1979) (Clause's
"purpose was to preserve the constitutional structure of separate, coequal, and independent
branches of government."). James Madison wrote that "the reason and necessity of the privi-
lege must be the guide" in interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause. 4 WRrrINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 221 (Hunt ed. 1910).
39 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880) (Speech or Debate Clause is defense
to tort action brought against members of House of Representatives for false imprisonment
arising out of imprisonment by House for contempt).
40 In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), the Court broadly interpreted the
Speech or Debate Clause to fulfill the purposes of the Clause. By its terms, the Speech or
Debate Clause does not extend immunity to legislative activities other than speeches made
during a session of Congress. Considering, however, the historical development of the Clause,
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More recent decisions have narrowed the types of business related acts
protected by legislative immunity.41
The Supreme Court extended congressional immunity to suits for
injunctive relief in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund.42 As with
damage claims, in actions for injunctive relief "judicial power is still
brought to bear on Members of Congress and legislative independence is
imperiled."' 43 The Speech or Debate Clause and the separation of pow-
see notes 37-38 supra, the Court interpreted it to provide a blanket immunity for all congres-
sional processes. The Court's definition protects Congress's use of any procedures germane to
the accomplishment of its legislative responsibilities. Kilboum restricts the immunity only
where members of Congress use extraordinary procedures or are not involved in activities
related to the legislative process.
41 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (Speech or Debate Clause inap-
plicable to congressional dissemination of information through press releases or newsletters);
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (Speech or Debate Clause inapplicable to public dis-
semination of materials that infringe upon individual privacy); Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606 (1972) (Speech or Debate Clause inapplicable to an arrangement for private publi-
cation of classified government documents); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972)
(Speech or Debate Clause does not bar criminal prosecution of former Senator if charges do
not require inquiry into legislative acts or motivation).
Hutchinson, Doe, and Gravel draw a distinction between Congress's authority to inform
itself regarding governmental affairs and its authority to inform the public about these affairs,
limiting legislative immunity to the former category of activities. See Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. at 625-26. This distinction has been criticized as failing to recognize Congress's role
in informing the public. Ste id. at 636-37 (Douglas, J., and Brennan, J., dissenting). For a
critical account of these decisions, see Erwin, The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on
Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L. REv. 175 (1973). Congress's role in informing the public
has long been recognized. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 650-51 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); THE REORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CON-
GRESS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION 14 (1945) ("With the decline of
Congress as an original source of legislation, this function . . . of keeping public opinion in
touch with the conduct of the government becomes increasingly important. . . . Congress
serves as a forum through which public opinion can be expressed, general policy discussed,
and the conduct of governmental affairs exposed and criticized."); W. WILSON, CONGRES-
SIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (1885) ("It is the proper duty of a representative body to look
diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees."). Congress-
men may, for example, release information for the purpose of creating public support for
legislation or to expose official misconduct, thereby remedying abuses without resorting to
legislation. The Court's recent decisions appear to have lost sight of these realities of modern
government and have impaired Congress's ability to control the governmental apparatus
through public opinion.
42 421 U.S. 491 (1975). In Eastland, a congressional committee had subpoenaed the
bank records of the United States Servicemen's Fund, an anti-war group. The Fund, hoping
to preserve the anonymity of its contributors, sought an injunction barring implementation of
the subpoena as a violation of the first amendment. Id. at 496. Because the subpoena was
directed to a third party, the Fund could not test the validity of the subpoena in the tradi-
tional manner-a contempt proceeding following failure to comply. Id. at 498.
In practice, Eastland does not prevent injunctions against congressional action. See, e.g.,
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (applicants blocked dissemination of potentially dam-
aging congressional report by obtaining injunction against Public Printer barring publication
of the report).
43 421 U.S. at 503. The Court stated that "once it is determined that Members [of
Congress] are acting within the 'legitimate legislative sphere' the Speech or Debate Clause is
an absolute bar to interference." Id. (citing Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314 (1973)).
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ers doctrine thus required an extension of immunity because the delay
caused by judicial proceedings 4 threatened to interfere with Congress's
exercise of its legitimate legislative powers.45
The Supreme Court held state legislators immune from damage
claims brought under the Civil Rights Act46 in Tenney v. Brandhove.47
Basing its decision on historical data demonstrating a "tradition of legis-
lative freedom . . . carefully preserved in the formation of State and
National Governments," 48 the Court ruled that "the statute . [did]
not create civil liability for [legislative] conduct. '49 The Court recog-
nized that having federal courts process these claims would unjustifiably
threaten legislative independence.50 The Court, however, limited its
Eastland indicates that under the second tier of immunity analysis, see note 15 and accompa-
nying text supra, the separation of powers doctrine will not tolerate judicial interference with
congressional activity.
44 The Court appeared particularly concerned with the time required to obtain judicial
review. In Eastland, nearly five years had passed between the issuance of the committee's
subpoena and the Supreme Court's ruling upholding its enforceability. 421 U.S. at 511.
45 Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, concurred separately to
restate his view that the Speech or Debate Clause "does not immunize congressional action
from judicial review." 421 U.S. at 513. He noted that "[t]his case does not present the ques-
tions of what would be the proper procedure. . . in an effort to get before a court a constitu-
tional challenge to a subpoena duces tecuin issued to a third party." Id. at 517. Justice Douglas
dissented, arguing that the Speech or Debate Clause does not apply to activities that violate
first amendment rights. Id. at 518.
46 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The Act provides: "Every person who, under color of [law]
• . . subjects. . . any citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any rights...
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable. . . in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress." The Supreme Court permitted a similar cause of action
for damages against federal officers for fourth amendment violations in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Court appears
ready to extend the scope of Bivers to other constitutional violations by federal officers. See
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (private right of action found for eighth amendment
violation); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,486 (1978) ("Bivens established that compensable
injury to a constitutionally protected interest could be vindicated by a suit for damages
.. .S'egenera/
,
y P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HowE & E. BROWN, supra note 26, at
108-09 (4th ed. Supp. 1980); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 20, at 176-92 (Supp. 1981).
47 341 U.S. 367 (1951). Brandhove sued a state legislative committee and its members,
claiming damages caused by its investigation of his activities.
48 Id. at 376. For a discussion of the historical data, most notably the seventeenth cen-
tury struggle between the English King and Parliament, see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra
note 37, at 1122-35.
49 341 U.S. at 379. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Frankfurter did not indicate
whether his resolution of the case depended on a separation of powers or a federalism analy-
sis. At that time, considerable uncertainty existed regarding the applicability of separation of
powers analysis to federal court review of state action. The Court resolved the issue I 1 years
later in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), holding that the separation of powers doctrine
does not bar federal court review of state action. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text
supra. Justice Frankfurter dissented in Baker, arguing that separation of powers analysis does
present such a bar. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
50 The Court stated that "[c]ourts are not the place for such controversies." 341 U.S. at
378. It referred to other, more appropriate, checks on legislative abuses, declaring that "[s]elf-
discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such
abuses." Id.
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holding to state legislators' liability for damages under the Civil Rights
Act;51 its ruling did not extend to claims of legislative immunity raised
in other contexts.52
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether legislative immunity
bars federal courts from issuing injunctions against state legislators.5 3
Dicta from some opinions suggest that the Court recognizes a similarity
between the immunity of state legislators and the immunity accorded
members of Congress.54 If these dicta indicate that the Court equates
the scope of state and federal legislative immunity, a second-tier issue,55
then Eastland's grant of immunity from injunctive relief to members of
Congress requires a similar grant to state legislators. These dicta may,
however, reflect only a recognition that similar problems of interference
with legislative activity attach both to federal court actions against state
legislators and to federal court actions against members of Congress-a
first-tier issue.5 6 This first-tier similarity does not require an extension of
Congress's absolute immunity from federal court injunctions to state leg-
51 "We conclude only. . . that the statute of 1871 does not create civil liability for such
conduct." Id. at 379. The Court, however, questioned whether Congress has the constitu-
tional power to abrogate legislative immunity. Id. at 376.
52 Although the Court limited its holding to liability for damages under the Civil Rights
Act, see id. at 376, 379, its reasoning suggests a broad view of the scope of state legislative
immunity in this context. The Court referred to legislative immunity as a right of the com-
munity, not a personal right belonging to legislators. Id. at 377. See Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass.
1, 27 (1808) ("[T]hese privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protecting the
members... , but to support the rights of the people. . . .'). Under this reasoning, the
imposition of liability distracts legislators from the performance of their public duties and
thus interferes with the community's interest in effective government. See 341 U.S. at 377.
Any judicial proceeding represents a distraction to legislators, see note 18 supra, and, under
the Court's reasoning, would seem to require an extension of immunity. The Pourt, however,
has indicated that it might not apply this analysis to other judicial proceedings against legis-
lators. "'It is not necessary to decide here that there may not be things done, in the one
House or the other, of an extraordinary character, for which the members who take part in
the act may be held legally responsible.'" 341 U.S. at 378-79 (quoting Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880)). See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 372 (1980) (holding
state legislators subject to federal criminal prosecutions and arguing that Temzey "presumed
the existence of federal criminal liability as a restraining factor on the conduct of state
officials').
53 One commentator has interpreted the Court's silence as a recognition of the suscepti-
bility of state legislators to a federal court's equitable jurisdiction. See Weinberg, supra note
13, at 1232-33.
54 The Court has used language from federal and state legislative immunity cases inter-
changeably. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-06
(1975); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84-85 (1967); United States v. Johnson, 383
U.S. 169, 180 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-79 (1951). The Court does not
indicate that it equates the two types of immunity; it merely finds a similarity of interests
involved in the two, particularly with regard to issues involving first-tier analysis. This poten-
tially misleading use of precedent may result from the relative scarcity of legislative immunity
cases decided by the Court.
55 Given the different constitutional bases for state and federal legislative immunity, see
notes 20-26 and accompanying text supra, this result seems improper.
56 Similar concerns affect the immunity of members of Congress and state legislators
under first-tier analysis. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text sup ra.
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islators because second-tier analysis recognizes different levels ofjustifia-
ble interference under separation of powers and federalism analyses.57
In United States v. Gillock,58 the Supreme Court refused to recognize
a state legislator's claim of legislative immunity in a federal criminal
prosecution, thus suggesting a distinction between the scope of federal
and state legislative immunity.59 The Court, rejecting the defendant
legislator's request to suppress evidence of his legislative acts under the
Speech or Debate Clause, declared that the Clause is limited "by its
terms . . . to federal legislators." 60 The Court concluded that separa-
tion of powers, the policy underlying the Speech or Debate Clause, is
irrelevant in a federal prosecution of a state legislator.6' Noting that
federalism imposes a less stringent restraint on federal court action than
does the separation of powers doctrine,62 the Court held that "where
important federal interests are at stake, as in the enforcement of federal
criminal statutes, comity yields." 63 The Court stated that federalism
bars federal court action only where judicial review "result[s] in a direct
federal impact on traditional state governmental functions." 64
57 See notes 20-26 and accompanying text supra.
58 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
59 Gillock, a Tennessee state senator, was indicted on seven counts of violating federal
criminal statutes. At trial, the federal district court granted Gillock's motion to suppress evi-
dence related to his legislative acts, and the government appealed. The Court acknowledged
that the evidentiary privilege granted members of Congress under the Speech or Debate
Clause would compel exclusion of similar evidence in a prosecution of a congressman, 445
U.S. at 366-67, but ruled that the evidence was admissible in a prosecution of a state
legislator.
60 Id. at 374.
61 Id. at 369-70. The central purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is "'to preserve
the constitutional structure of separate, coequal, and independent branches of government.' "
Id. at 369 (quoting United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477,491 (1979)). State governmental
bodies do not qualify as "separate, coequal, and independent branches of government."
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Therefore, "the separation-of-powers doctrine [ ] gives no
support to the grant of a privilege to state legislators in federal criminal prosecutions." 445
U.S. at 370.
62 "[F]ederal interference in the state legislative process is not on the same constitutional
footing with the interference of one branch of the Federal Government in the affairs of a
coequal branch." 445 U.S. at 370 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)). "[T1he
Supremacy Clause dictates that federal enactments will prevail over competing state exercises
of power." 445 U.S. at 370. The Court noted the limited scope of federal power, id., but held
that where the federal government has properly exercised its power, state legislative immu-
nity does not bar the federal action. Id. at 370-74.
63 Id. at 373. The Court distinguished Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), see
notes 46-52 and accompanying text supra, as applying only to civil actions brought in federal
courts. The Court reasoned that Tenne implicitly recognized federal criminal prosecutions as
a check on legislative misconduct. 445 U.S. at 372-73.
64 445 U.S. at 371 (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). In
National League of Cities, the Court held that the application of the federal minimum wage law
to state employees would interfere with the states' sovereign powers. Under principles of
federalism, federal control of state activity is acceptable where the Constitution grants the
federal government authority to act. See general'y L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL
LAW § 5-2 (1978). National League of Cities acts as a limitation on the federal government's
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The circuit courts have divided on the question whether federalism
bars federal courts from issuing injunctions against state legislators. 65 In
Jordah v. Hutcheson,66 the Fourth Circuit held that the district court had
jurisdiction to issue an injunction against a state legislative committee
alleged to have used its investigative powers to harass civil rights activ-
ists. 67 The court stated that "[a]lthough the federal courts will recognize
and respect the [state] . . . legislature['s] broad investigatory powers,
nevertheless these powers are not unlimited and it remains the duty of
the federal courts to protect the individual's constitutional rights. '68 If
the plaintiff demonstrates a "clear possibility of an immediate and irrep-
arable injury to [his constitutionally protected] rights," the federal court
can issue the injunction. 69
The Second Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in Star Dislribu-
constitutional authority by preventing the federal government from acting "directly [to] dis-
place the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.. . ." 426 U.S. at 852. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and notes 31-33
and accompanying text supra (principles of federalism generally bar federal courts from issu-
ing injunctions against pending state criminal prosecutions).
Under National League of Cities, the federal government may not act in fields that impli-
cate traditional state governmental functions and which constitute a direct displacement of
state authority. In NationalLeague of Cities, the federal minimum wage constrained the state's
ability to allocate resources according to its own policies-a traditional state governmental
function. In like manner, liability of state legislators may allow a federal court to impose
constraints upon officials' actions and thereby interfere with traditional state governmental
functions. The Supreme Court, however, distinguished Gillock from National League of Cities
because of the directness of the federal regulation in Gillock. 445 U.S. at 371. The Court
stated that although the threat of personal liability "might conceivably influence [a state
legislator's] conduct while in the legislature, it is not in any sense analogous to the direct
regulation imposed by the federal wage-fixing legislation in National League of Cities." Id.
65 The Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have granted state legislators immunity from
injunctive suits. See Star Distribs., Ltd. v. Marino, 613 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1980); Smith v. Kleck-
er, 554 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977); Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1976).
The Fourth Circuit has denied state legislators immunity from injunctions. See Jordan v.
Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963). The Star listributors andJordan opinions provide the
most complete discussions of the competing interests in these cases.
66 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963).
67 Plaintiff attorneys represented various clients seeking desegregation of Virginia
schools. To frustrate the plaintiffs' activities, the Virginia legislature passed a statute in 1956
redefining the offenses of champerty and barratry. The legislature also created a committee
to investigate the enforcement of these new laws. In 1958, the underlying statute was ruled
constitutional, NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958), vacated, Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), and the legislature enacted a revised version of the statute. 323
F.2d at 599-603.
68 323 F.2d at 601. The court noted that federalism does not shield "the activities of the
executive and judicial branches of the state from interdiction when constitutional rights are
involved." Id. (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)).
69 323 F.2d at 601; cf. note 32 and accompanying text supra (outlining the requirements
for an injunction under Younger). Younger set similar standards for the interposition of federal
court injunctive relief in state criminal proceedings. Younger, however, requires a plaintiff to
make a somewhat greater showing of threatened injury and also looks to the adequacy of
alternative state remedial procedures. See note 31 supra.
1981]
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tors, Ltd v. Marino 70 and refused to enjoin a state legislative committee's
investigation of child pornography. 71 Noting the similar concerns un-
derlying the immunity of federal and state legislators 72 and the distinc-
tion between the requirements of separation of powers and federalism, 73
the court declared that "[w]e show no more than 'a proper respect for
state functions' . . . in holding that state legislators must be accorded a
privilege similar to that of federal legislators.' 74
70 613 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1980).
71 Several factual differences distinguishJordan from Star Distributors, making the latter
less amenable to federal court action. First, the plaintiffs inJordan alleged a continuing cam-
paign of harassment by the legislature, 323 F.2d at 599, while the plaintiffs in Star Distributors
challenged a single act of the legislature. 613 F.2d at 5-6. Second, the underlying statute in
Jordan resembled special legislation directed at the plaintiffs, 323 F.2d at 602-03, while the
statute in Star Distributors was of more general application. 613 F.2d at 5. The Star Distributors
legislature's interest in controlling child pornography and organized crime, 613 F.2d at 5,
arguably represented a more substantial state function than theJordan legislature's interest in
controlling champerty and barratry. 323 F.2d at 602-03. Finally, in Jordan, the presence of
third party victims of the legislature's investigation, 323 F.2d at 604, prevented the plaintiffs
from protecting their rights through disobedience-an option available to Star Distributors.
613 F.2d at 6.
72 The court stated that members of Congress are immune from injunctive suits because
the burdens of defending such suits would threaten to interfere with legislative activities. 613
F.2d at 7. This reasoning applies only to first-tier analysis of the immunity claim--measure-
ment of the level of interference; it does not apply necessarily to second-tier analysis. See
generalfy notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
73 613 F.2d at 9. The court, however, did not explain what significance, if any, it at-
tached to this distinction.
74 Id. (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (citation omitted)). The court
further supported its decision to grant immunity by stating that "'[t]o create a system in
which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does that
of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head.'" Id. (quoting Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
The court's application of Butz's reasoning to a case involving state legislative immunity
appears inappropriate. The Bill of Rights is concerned primarily with substantive protections
for individual rights. In this area, the Constitution imposes greater limitations on the federal
government than it does on state governments. See L. TRIBE, supra note 64, § 11-12.
The Star Distributors and Butz courts, however, were concerned primarily with remedies
for constitutional violations. In this area, the Supreme Court has recognized a presumption
in favor of redressing constitutional violations. See note 11 supra. Given this presumption, the
identity of the offending official should make little difference; complete redress should be the
general rule. The development of the Bivens implied right of action for constitutional viola-
tions by federal executive officials is evidence of the weight of the presumption. See generallv
note 11 supra.
Other factors may intervene to rebut this presumption. Members of Congress, for exam-
ple, are specifically exempted from immunity by the constitutional language of the Speech or
Debate Clause. This textual limitation upon congressional liability creates a problem in
equating the liability of federal and state legislators in the way that Butz equated the liability
of federal and state executive officials. Equating the liability of federal and state legislators
would require a limitation of the liability of state legislators for constitutional violations. Al-
though such a limitation would alleviate the imbalance between the liability of state and
federal officials, it would contravene the presumption of providing redress for constitutional
violations, an impermissible result under the fourteenth amendment. See note 11-13 and ac-
companying text sup ra.
In light of these considerations, Butz's policy of granting state officials equal or greater
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In sum, the Speech or Debate Clause and the doctrine of separation
of powers provide members of Congress with virtually absolute immu-
nity from suits for damages and injunctive relief arising out of their offi-
cial conduct. Concerns of federalism provide state legislators with
similar immunity from suits for damages, but it remains an open ques-
tion whether they are immune from suits for injunctive relief. Supreme
Court dicta and decisions in related fields, along with lower court opin-
ions, provide conflicting views on the ultimate resolution of this issue.
2. Judicial Immunity
Virtually absolute immunity protects state75 court judges from
damage claims. In Bradley v. Fisher,76 the Supreme Court upheld a di-
rected verdict based on the defendant judge's immunity in a suit for
damages.7" Citing an old common law tradition of judicial immunity,78
the Court emphasized the potential damage to the independence of ju-
dicial proceedings that liability might occasion. 79 Two Justices dis-
sented, arguing that judges should be liable for their malicious and
corrupt acts. 80 The majority suggested that the availability of alterna-
tive checks upon judicial misconduct81 removed the need to hold judges
immunity than federal officials must be qualified to guarantee a remedy for constitutional
violations. Maintaining a balance between state and federal liability may remain a subsidi-
ary goal-one that is subject to the explicit language of the Constitution. In the case of
legislative immunity, the Speech or Debate Clause requires a compromise of this goal. There-
fore, the policy of Butz, though generally correct and laudable, should not apply to a case
involving state legislative immunity.
75 This Note does not discuss the immunity of federal judges, because it appears that
there are no reported decisions to date discussing the applicability of the judicial immunity
doctrine to federal court judges.
76 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). The Court decided Bradl, several months before the
passage of the 1871 Civil Rights Act.
77 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 340-41. Plaintiff attorney sued for damages after the defendant
judge had removed him from the roll of attorneys because of his misconduct during the de-
fense of a man charged with murdering Abraham Lincoln. Id. at 344.
78 The Court cited a list of English and American authorities, including Justice Mayne,
Chancellor Kent, Chief Justice Coke, and Chief Justice Shaw. Id. at 347-49.
79 "Liability. . . would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be
either respectable or useful." Id. at 347. See general/, note 34 sufira. A cynic might attribute
the Justices' extraordinary sensitivity to the requirements of adjudication to their personal
interest in maintaining judicial immunity.
80 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 357. However appealing as a deterrent to judicial misconduct,
this standard would pose serious practical problems. Guiltless judges charged with malicious
and corrupt conduct would be required to face a trial on the merits. Early dismissal of
groundless claims would be unlikely because of courts' inclination not to determine issues
involving an element of intent without a trial on the merits. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FED-
ERAL COURTS § 99, at 493 (3d ed. 1976). The defense of these lawsuits would substantially
interfere with the duties of the judiciary. In contrast, the majority's standard would rarely
require a trial on the merits. Because immunity attaches to any exercise ofjudicial authority,
the only inquiry will be whether the judge has performed a judicial act. This inquiry does not
involve a question of intent and may be completed without extensive consideration of the
facts of the case.
81 E.g., impeachment. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 350.
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liable for damages. Later, commentators developed this argument by
referring to the procedural safeguards of appellate review as a means of
protecting against judicial misconduct. 82 The Court's recent decision in
Stump v. Sparkman,83 however, ignored the alternative remedy argu-
ment84 by sanctioning immunity in cases in which no effective appellate
review is available.85
82 See Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Erecu-
live Oftiials, 74 HARv. L. REv. 44, 53-56 (1960); Note, Federal Executive Immunity From Civil
Liability in Damages.- A Reevaluation of Barr v. Matteo, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 625, 647 (1977).
83 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (state court judge immune from claim for damages arising out of
his sterilization order of a slightly retarded woman in a proceeding laden with gross procedu-
ral defects).
84 Three Justices dissented, arguing that the presence of gross procedural errors dis-
solved the judge's immunity. The judge's order came in an informal ex parte hearing in
which the woman was not represented by counsel or given notice of the proceeding. These
procedural irregularities foreclosed the opportunity for appellate review to correct the judge's
errors. Id. at 369-70 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The majority, ignoring this problem, set out a two-part test for granting judicial immu-
nity: (1) the judge must perform a judicial act; and (2) the judge must not be acting in the
clear absence of jurisdiction. The majority stated that
the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a "judicial" one relate to
the nature of the act itself, ie., whether it is a function normally performed by
a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, ie., whether they dealt with
the judge in his judicial capacity.
Id. at 362. The majority relied on Bradl v. Fisher for its explanation of "clear absence of
jurisdiction":
A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the
clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is
clearly no jurisidiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a
usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of
jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where juris-
diction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court
which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exer-
cised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other ques-
tions involved in the case. . . .
435 U.S. at 356 n.6 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1871)).
The Court noted a line of cases in which the circuit courts have held state court judges
liable because their acts were not part of the judicial function. 435 U.S. at 361 n. 10. Re-
cently, two circuits have used Stump's judicial act requirement to deny immunity to state
court judges. See Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2020
(1981) (prior agreement to rule favorably on guardianship petition not a protected judicial
act); Vanderwater v. Lopez, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980)
(participation in prosecution not a protected judicial act).
Stump has generated much criticism. See, e.g., Block, Stump v. Sparkman andthe Histog, of
Judicialmmunity, 1980 DuKE LJ. 879; Nagel, sufpra note 10; Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman:
The Doctrine ofjudicial Impunity, 64 VA. L. REv. 833 (1978).
85 Slump does not recognize a-constitutional requirement of absolute immunity for state
court judges. The plaintiffs in Stump had two available approaches. They might have argued
for a shift in the extent of the immunity from the absolute protection of Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967), to the qualified view of Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). Instead, the
parties litigated the case as a possible limitation on the "judicial act" that underlies the exten-
sion of imriiunity. Both sides implicitly agreed that absolute immunity follows from the un-
derlying judicial act.
The relatively recent decision in Pierson probably deterred the Stump plaintiffs from chal-
lenging the standard of absolute immunity. They might, however, have challenged Pierson by
204
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
The susceptibility of state judges to injunctive suits is less clear.
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue.86 Dicta in
O'Shea v. Littleton,87 in which the Court denied an injunction against a
state court, suggest that judicial immunity would not protect against
"otherwise criminal deprivations of constitutional rights."'88 This indi-
cates that, at least in the area of criminal prosecutions for civil rights
violations, the Court does not view judicial immunity from injunction as
absolute. Future decisions must develop the scope of this exception.
Several circuits already have allowed actions for injunctive relief against
state court judges.89
referring to the subsequent development of the doctrine of qualified immunity. The Court
might have followed the approach it took in Scheuer, viewing qualified immunity as a refine-
ment ofthis branch ofofficial immunity. Instead, the Court assumed that absolute immunity
followed the judicial act.
The Stump decision probably forecloses this means of modifying judicial immunity. At
its very least, Stump indicates that under the common law view, absolute immunity still exists.
This does not mean, however, that Congress cannot pass a statute limiting state court judges
to qualified immunity from damage suits. Such a statute would overturn the common law
basis for absolute immunity relied upon in Pierson and Sump and remove any statutory ambi-
guity in favor of imposing liability.
The question remains whether this statute would pass constitutional muster. Arguably,
the possibility of liability would represent an unconstitutional threat to the independence of
the state judiciary. Most of the concerns involved in first-tier analysis, see notes 16-19 and
accompanying text supra, apply with similar force to the defense of any action, regardless of
the presence of a qualified immunity. Only absolute immunity will remove the burdens im-
posed by liability.
The second-tier question whether these burdens are permissible remains. The need to
provide redress for constitutional violations, see note 13 supra, militates in favor of the imposi-
tion of liability. In the analogous field of executive immunity, the Court held a state governor
entitled to only a qualified immunity. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). Federal
authority over state court judges presents a lesser threat to the state's sovereignty than does
similar authority over the state's highest official-its governor. Still, a court could point to
thejudiciary's particular susceptibility to undue influence to justify requiring absolute immu-
nity. See note 34 supra.
In the final analysis, the determination of whether such a statute violates the Constitu-
tion requires the Court to make a judgment call. Would imposition of liability under § 1983,
limited by a qualified immunity, present a sufficient threat to judicial independence to com-
promise the integrity of the state's judiciary and require a deteimination that the statute is
unconstitutional? Given all of the factors discussed above, such a statute should pass constitu-
tional muster.
86 In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., the Court distin-
guished a number of its own precedents to reach the conclusion that "we have not addressed
the question." 446 U.S. at 735.
87 414 U.S. 488 (1974). The Court disposed of the case on the ground that the plaintiffs
had failed to demonstrate the presence of a case or controversy. Id. at 493-99. The Court
cited Younger as an alternative justification for its result. Id. at 499.
88 Id. at 503. The Court stated: "[W]e have never held that the performance of the
duties ofjudicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization
of otherwise criminal deprivations of constitutional rights." Id.
89 See, e.g., Heimbach v. Village of Lyons, 597 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1979); Timmerman v.
Brown, 528 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1975); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1978). These
cases offer little insight into the factors behind the courts' refusal to grant judicial immunity
from injunctive actions. The cases generally distinguish Bradl/f and Stump as barring claims
1981]
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3. Executive Immunity
Conflicting concerns of federalism and protection of federally guar-
anteed rights contributed to the development, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,90 of a
qualified immunity9' from damage sUits92 for state executive officials.
Although the Scheuer Court recognized the disruptive effect of judicial
proceedings on a state's executive functions,93 it concluded that "gov-
ernment officials, as a class, could not be totally exempt. . . from liabil-
ity under [the terms of section 1983]."9 4 The Court found that federal
courts must retain the power to review the acts of state executive offi-
cials. 95 Otherwise,
the fiat of a state Governor, and not the Constitution of the United
States, would be the supreme law of the land;. . . the restrictions of
the Federal Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be
but impotent phrases, the futility of which the State may at any time
disclose by the simple process of transferring powers of legislation to
the Governor to be exercised by him, beyond control, upon his asser-
tion of necessity.96
for damages only and hold that judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive relief.
The opinions, however, do not offer any rationale for this distinction.
90 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The claim in Scheuer arose out of the deaths of three students
during the 1970 anti-war disturbance at Kent State University. Parents of the victims
brought suit for damages against the Governor of Ohio and other high-ranking executive
officials, charging violations of the students' constitutional rights. The Court rejected the
defendant officials' claim of absolute immunity, remanding the case for a determination of
liability under a qualified immunity standard.
91 The term "immunity" is something of a misnomer in these cases. Unlike absolute
immunity, qualified immunity does not act as a bar to federal court jurisdiction. Rather, it
acts as an affirmative defense for the defendant. The defense depends heavily on the propri-
ety of the official's conduct. As a result, the defendant usually has to defend a trial on the
merits. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976); note 97 and accompanying
text in/ta.
92 Federal courts may issue injunctions against state executive officials to prohibit un-
constitutional conduct. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See generallz L. TRIBE, supra
note 64, § 3-38.
93 416 U.S. at 239-41. The Court stated:
[O]fficial immunity apparently rested, in its genesis, on two mutually depen-
dent rationales: (1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of
subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligation of his
position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability
would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the
judgment required by the public good.
Id. at 240 (footnote omitted). See generally notes 16-17 and accompanying text upra.
94 416 U.S. at 243.
95 Id. at 248. The Court emphasized the constitutional limitations upon state conduct:
[When a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the
Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representa-
tive character. . . .The State has no power to impart to him any immunity
from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
Id. at 237 (quoting Expare Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)).
96 416 U.S. at 248 (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 (1932)). Executive
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Still, fears of disrupting state activities led the Court to grant a varying
degree of immunity to individual executive officers, depending on the
reasonableness of their actions and the scope of their discretionary
powers. 97
A similar qualified immunity shields federal executive officials from
damage suits.98 Cabinet level officials received absolute immunity in
common law tort claims because "[i]t would seriously cripple the ...
administration of. . .the executive branch of the government if [they]
were subjected to [such damage claims]." 99 The Supreme Court later
extended this immunity to other executive officers in view of the poten-
tial disruptive effect of liability on executive action.100 The Court, how-
ever, recently distinguished these decisions in ruling that immunity does
not shield executive officials charged with violations of constitutional
rights. 101 The judicial duty to protect constitutional rights prohibits a
action falls into two major categories: ministerial acts and discretionary acts. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) (1976) (creating distinction between discretionary and other governmental func-
tions). Ministerial acts involve the implementation of specific statutes and regulations and
only a limited amount of discretionary judgment. By reference to statutory law, the public
may predict accurately the executive's ministerial actions. Thus, a victim threatened by pos-
sible executive implementation of a statute is able to seek prospective relief. In contrast, the
executive's discretionary acts, such as instigation of a criminal investigation, involve the exer-
cise of considerable independent judgment. In this area, the public generally cannot predict
the executive's actions. This uncertainty makes prospective relief for official misconduct im-
possible. Liability in damages is necessary to provide some redress from official misconduct.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 409-10
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). See genera'y Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Offtcers: Damage
Actions, 77 HA v. L. REv. 209, 218-25 (1963).
97 The extent of the immunity depends on the official action involved. In Scheuer, the
Court stated that
the variation [is] dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities
of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time
of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of
reasonable grounds for the belief [in the validity of the action] formed at the
time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with the good-faith belief,
that affords a basis for qualified immunity ....
416 U.S. at 247-48. In Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975), the Court refined this
formulation to require officials to meet both a subjective and objective test of good faith. The
subjective portion of this test requires an official to act "with a belief that he is doing right
... ." Id. In Wood, however, the Court held that the defendant school board members did
not act reasonably, and therefore failed to satisfy the objective portion of the good faith test
when they acted with "disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights." Id.
at 322.
98 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), in which the Court stated: "[W]e deem
it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against
sthte officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal
officials." Id at 504. Federal executive officers are subject to suits for injunctions.
99 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896). In Spalding, the plaintiff brought a
defamation claim seeking damages from the Postmaster General for the Postmaster General's
alleged malicious actions against the plaintiff.
100 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabiliza-
tion absolutely immune from libel claim arising out of official conduct).
101 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). The Butz Court drew a distinction between
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grant of immunity for unconstitutional executive action. 102 Still, preser-
vation of the executive's position in the constitutional structure contin-
ues to require a qualified immunity similar to that accorded state
officials.10 3
4. Functional Approach
The Court's emphasis on preventing disruption of governmental ac-
tivities led to the extension of official immunity to situations beyond the
scope of traditional legislative, judicial, and executive immunity. 0 4 As
one commentator has noted, it is "not the dignity of high political office,
but the nature of the functions exercised [that] is the touchstone of the
• ..privilege." 105 This attitude prompted the Court to adopt a func-
tional approach to immunity in Butz v. Economou. 06 Citing the general
rule that executive officials have only a qualified immunity,10 7 the Court
examined the defendant officials' duties to determine whether their per-
formance required a broader grant of immunity. The Court found that
the defendants' duties were "'functionally comparable' to [those] of a
judge."'10  Noting that "j]udges have absolute immunity. . because
of the special nature of their responsibilities,"' 0 9 the Court granted the
same absolute immunity to the defendant executive officials. 10
claims based on common law violations and claims based on violations of constitutional
rights. Id at 495. In practice, this distinction contains little substance. Common law claims
"may be readily converted by any legal neophyte into a claim of denial of procedural due
process under the Fifth Amendment." Id at 522 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Note, Quali-
fed Immunity for Eecutive Ofiials for Constitutional Violations: Butz v. Economou, 20 B.C. L.
REV. 575, 597-98 (1979); Note, GovernmentalImmunio---ivil Rights--Constitutional Law--Scpe of
Immunity Available to Federal Executive OffRials, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 604, 619-20. Litigants con-
fronted with this situation may choose to present their claims as constitutional rather than
common law violations, thereby avoiding the greater immunity provided by Barr and
Spalding.
102 438 U.S. at 489-91. The Court noted that "extension of absolute immunity from
damages liability to all federal executive officials would seriously erode the protection pro-
vided by basic constitutional guarantees." Id. at 505.
103 For a discussion of qualified immunity, see notes 13 & 97 and accompanying text
supra.
104 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-12 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 241-42 (1974); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571-73 (1959).
105 Note, The Scope of Imunil'for Legislators and Their Employees, 77 YALE L.J. 366, 384
(1967).
106 438 U.S. 478 (1978). The latter portion of the opinion addresses specifically the im-
munity of agency attorneys and hearings officers involved in administrative law proceedings.
The Court found that the functions of these executive officials are analogorus to those of prose-
cutors and judges in court proceedings. Id. at 508-16.
107 See notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra.
108 438 U.S. at 513.
109 Id. at 511.
110 Manifesting its intention to retain the general rule of liability, the Court held that
"officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct
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II
SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA V. CONSUMERS UNION OF
THE UNITED STATES, INC.
Acting under the authority of a state enabling statute"' and its
own inherent power to regulate and discipline attorneys, 512 the Supreme
Court of Virginia (Virginia Court) promulgated the Virginia Code of
Professional Responsibility." 3 Enforcement power lay in the State Bar
must bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope." Id.
at 506.
In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979),
the Court applied a functional approach to grant absolute immunity from damage claims to
a quasi-legislative state agency responsible for regional development. Lake Country Estates
landowners sought damages from the defendant planning agency claiming that TRPA's pro-
mulgation of a land use plan had diminished the value of their property in violation of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. TRPA was a multi-state appointive body responsible for
overseeing regional development. The Court rejected TRPA's claims of sovereign immunity,
id. at 400-02, but applied a functional approach to grant the individual defendants absolute
legislative immunity from damages. Id. at 402-06.
Three Justices dissented in Lake Conig, Estates, criticizing the majority's use of the func-
tional approach. The dissenters did not address the characterization of the land use plan as a
legislative act, but focused their concerns on the institutional differences between TRPA and
a state legislature. None of the members of TRPA was subject to the electorate. Further,
TRPA had no internal procedures for disciplining its members. See id. at 406-08 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); id. at 408-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Given these institutional differences,
the dissenters refused to accept the majority's analogy between TRPA and a state legislature
as an appropriate basis for immunity.
The dissent prompts consideration of the validity of the functional approach. First-tier
analysis of the threat of interference posed by judicial review depends on the nature of the
official's activities and the official's responsibility to the electorate. The absence of elections
increases the risk that the threat of liability will influence the official's actions, making TRPA
a better candidate for immunity than a legislature. Institutional differences play a more sub-
stantial role in determining the second-tier issue of permissible interference. See notes 20-26
and accompanying text su/ra. First, limitation upon the conduct of a quasi-legislative body's
functions does not pose as great a threat to state sovereignty as does a limitation upon the
conduct of the state legislature. Second, interference with an appointive body does not inter-
fere with state citizens' ability to elect their own representatives-an important element of
sovereignty. Given these considerations, extension of immunity based solely on a comparison
of functions is improper because of its failure to consider many elements necessary for proper
immunity analysis.
111 VA. CODE § 54-48 (1950) provides:
The Supreme Court may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promulgate
and amend rules and regulations:
(a) Defining the practice of law.
(al) Prescribing procedure for limited practice of law by third-year law
students.
(b) Prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of
attorneys-at-law. ...
(c) Prescribing procedure for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring at-
torneys-at-law.
112 See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446
U.S. 719, 721 (1980). See also Button v. Day, 204 Va. 547, 132 S.E.2d 292 (1963).
113 446 U.S. at 721-22. The Virginia Code did not differ in any relevant respect from the
American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility.
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and in the Virginia Court.1 4 After the United States Supreme C6urt
declared unconstitutional the provisions of the American Bar Associa-
tion Code of Professional Responsibility limiting attorney advertising, 15
the Virginia Court failed to modify its similar regulations. 116 Consum-
ers Union sought a permanent injunction in federal district court to en-
join enforcement of the regulations. 1 7 The district court issued the
injunction' 18 and found the Virginia Court liable for attorneys' fees be-
cause of its failure to modify the challenged regulations. 19 The Vir-
ginia Court appealed the fees award, claiming absolute judicial
immunity for its regulatory actions.' 20
The Supreme Court vacated the fees award, holding that legislative
immunity barred a federal court from imposing liability based on the
Virginia Court's legislative conduct. 21 The Court's analysis followed
I
114 See VA. CODE § 54-74 (1950).
115 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (enforcement of ban on attorney
advertising of fees violated first and fourteenth amendment rights of attorneys).
116 The Virginia Court refused to amend the regulations, even upon the request of the
state bar. See 446 U.S. at 726. More than 20 months passed between the Bates decision and
the district court injunction barring enforcement of the regulations. See Consumers Union of
the United States v. American Bar Ass'n, 470 F. Supp. 1055, 1063 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev'd sub
nom. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719
(1980).
117 In 1974, Consumers Union sought to elicit information regarding fees and services
from attorneys in order to publish a legal services directory. Recognizing the effect that the
Virginia Code's prohibition on attorney advertising would have on its efforts, Consumers
Union sought the injunction. 470 F. Supp. at 1057-58.
118 The district court's final order provided:
1. The publication described in plaintiffs complaint [the directory]
...is declared valid and constitutionally protected;
2. The Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule
2-102 (A) (6) is declared unconstitutional on its face;
3. The defendants. . . are permanently enjoined from enforcement of
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-102 (A) (6).
See 446 U.S. at 727 n.6.
119 Consumers Union sought $121,000 in attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). Jurisdictional Statement for Appel-
lant at 11, Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446
U.S. 719 (1980). The district court did not award attorneys' fees against the state Bar, be-
cause the state Bar had "unsuccessfully sought to persuade the court to amend the Code."
446 U.S. at 728. The court did award attorneys' fees against the Virginia Court, stating that
it "would hardly be unjust to order the Supreme Court of Virginia defendants to pay plain-
tiffs reasonable attorneys [sic] fees in light of their continued failure and apparent refusal to
amend [the Code] to conform with constitutional requirements." 470 F. Supp at 1063. The
attorneys' fees award focused on the Virginia Court's rulemaking activities, thereby raising
the issue of legislative immunity.
120 "At issue is the liability of a court for a judicial act." Jurisdictional Statement at 7,
supra note 119. The lone reference to legislative immunity appeared in Professor Kurland's
amicus brief. Brief for amicus curiae, Conference of Chief Justices, at 17, Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
121 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), pro-
vides the link between the fees award and the Court's discussion of official immunity. In
relevant part, the Act provides: "[I]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
section . . . 1983 . . .[of this title] ...the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
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two steps. First, the Court reasoned that absolute legislative immunity
would have barred a suit for injunctive relief against the state legislature
for refusing to amend the code.122 Second, the Court reasoned that this
immunity extends to state court judges acting in a legislative
capacity. 123
The Court's initial conclusion-that legislative immunity would
bar a suit against a state legislator in similar circumstances-represents
an extension of legislative immunity. Prior cases did not grant state leg-
islators immunity from injunctive suits.1 24 In support of its extension of
immunity, the Court noted its concern with the effect of judicial review
upon legislative independence 125 and cited cases that granted members
party. . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Under the Act, the district court's
fees award depended upon Consumers Union's ability to prevail under § 1983. The Supreme
Court found that "the District Court's award of attorney's fees in this case was premised on
acts or omissions for which [the Virginia Court] enjoyed absolute legislative immunity. This
was error." 446 U.S. at 738. The Court implied that the Virginia Court would be liable for
attorneys' fees under the Act for activities done in its enforcement capacity. Id. at 739. This
interpretation has the practical effect of dividing Consumers Union's claim into two suits-
one dealing with legislative activities, the other dealing with enforcement activities. Under
the Court's view, the activities giving rise to § 1983 liability must match the activities giving
rise to § 1988 liability.
122 446 U.S. at 733-34. "iT]here is little doubt that if the Virginia Legislature had en-
acted the State Bar Code and if suit had been brought against the legislature. . . for refusing
to amend the Code. . . ,the defendants in that suit could successfully have sought dismissal
on the grounds of absolute legislative immunity." Id. (footnote omitted).
The Court's opinion on this point may be given a very narrow reading. The legislature's
refusal to amend the Code would lie at the very heart of the legislature's functioning. Under
this reading, in future cases, the Court could limit the scope of state legislative immunity to
core-type functions. Such an interpretation ignores a number of contrary ideas developed
previously. First, the Consumers Union Court did not specifically distinguish legislative func-
tions. Second, the Court drew solely upon precedents that do not recognize any distinctions
among legislative functions. Most important, however, is the Court's treatment of the conflict
between the circuits on the issue of legislative immunity from injunctions. Id. at 732 n.10.
The Court indicated a clear preference for Star Distribs., Ltd. v. Marino, 613 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.
1980) (state legislative committee immune from action for injunctive and declaratory relieo,
as opposed to Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963) (legislative immunity no bar
to suits for prospective relief against state officials). The Court suggested thatJordan is no
longer viable precedent after Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491
(1975). 446 U.S. at 732 n.10.
These factors indicate that the Court will adopt an expansive interpretation of its hold-
ing in Consumers Union to find state legislators immune from suits for injunctive relief relating
to all their legislative functions.
123 Id. at 734. Significantly, the Court suggested that state court judges could be assessed
attorneys' fees in cases based on the judges' executive enforcement actions. Id. at 738-39. The
Third Circuit acted upon this suggestion in Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1980),
holding that judicial immunity does not bar recovery of attorneys' fees from judicial officers
engaged in executive actions.
124 See note 54 and accompanying text sufpra.
125 The Court emphasized the need to "preserve legislative independence." 446 U.S. at
731. This portion of the Court's opinion deals with first-tier analysis of the immunity claim.
See generally note 14 and accompanying text supra.
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of Congress immunity from both damage claims and injunctive suits.1 26
The Court stated that generally it equates federal and state legislative
immunity, 127 citing Gillock as an exception to the general rule. 128
The Court applied this extension of legislative immunity to the Vir-
ginia Court. Rejecting Consumers Union's contrary contention,1 29 the
Court concluded that the Virginia Court had exercised more than an
ordinary delegation of rulemaking authority; the Virginia Court had ex-
ercised the state's entire legislative power to regulate attorney con-
duct. 30 Moreover, the Virginia Court claimed the inherent power to
regulate attorney conduct. 131 Significantly, the Court did not indicate
the relative importance of these two factors in its resolution of the-
case, 132 leaving open the question whether either factor alone would re-
quire an extension of absolute legislative immunity to other government
officials. If either factor independently supports an extension of immu-
nity, the Court's decision will affect significantly the scope of executive
and judicial immunity. 133 Alternatively, if both factors must exist to
justify an extension of immunity, the decision will have a nominal
effect.' 3 4
126 446 U.S. at 731-32. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 42-45, 53-57 and accom-
panying text supra.
127 446 U.S. at 733. This portion of the Court's opinion deals with second-tier analysis of
the immunity claim. See generaly note 15 and accompanying text supra.
128 446 U.S. at 733. See generaly notes 58-64 and accompanying text supra. The Court
did not articulate the standard it would apply in the future to determine whether other ex-
ceptions might be appropriate or indicate the factors that it would consider in this
determination.
129 Consumers Union argued that the Virginia Court should not receive absolute legisla-
tive immunity where it is "merely exercising a delegated power to make rules." 446 U.S. at
734.
130 The Court stated that "the Virginia Court is exercising the State's entire legislative
power with respect to regulating the Bar, and its members are the State's legislators for the
purpose of issuing the Bar Code." Id.
131 Id.; see note 112 and accompanying text supra.
132 This difficulty relates back to the Court's failure to identify the precise basis of the
Virginia Court's authority to promulgate the Code. The Court noted both the Virginia
Court's claim to inherent judicial authority to regulate attorney conduct and the legislative
delegation of authority to the Virginia Court, but did not state which source of power justi-
fied the Virginia Court's promulgation of the Code or whether they acted as concurrent justi-
fications. See 446 U.S. at 721; notes 111-12 and accompanying text supra.
133 Judges exercise inherent judicial authority in other, more significant, areas than the
regulation of attorney conduct. If Consumers Union is read to suggest that the exercise of inher-
ent judicial authority alone requires a grant of absolute immunity, it may imply an extension
of immunity in this area. See notes 155-65 and accompanying text in/fa.
Executive officials often exercise substantial rulemaking authority. If the case is read to
suggest that exercise of substantial rulemaking authority requires a grant of absolute immu-
nity, it may imply an extension of immunity to these officials. See notes 166-69 and accompa-
nying text infra.
134 The coincidence of inherent judicial authority to regulate a field and a substantial
delegation of legislative power in the same field will be found rarely, if ever.
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III
IMPLICATIONS OF CONSUMERS UNION
Because of the Supreme Court's failure to articulate clearly the
standards it applied in Consumers Union, the decision is subject to a range
of interpretations. Although the opinion could be read to recognize sev-
eral significant extensions of official immunity, proper consideration of
the constitutional basis of official immunity supports a more restrictive
reading.
A. State Legislative Immunity from Injunctive Suit
In Consumers Union, the Supreme Court contended that state legisla-
tors are immune from injunctive suit. The Court properly relied on
cases gauging the effect of judicial interference on both federal and state
legislative activity-a first-tier issue.' 35 The Court failed, however, to
address sufficiently the second-tier issue in cases involving state legisla-
tors: whether this interference requires federal court abstention to pre-
serve the interests of federalism. 136 Noting the difference between
separation of powers and federalism, 3 7 the Court indicated that it was
not equating federal and state legislative immunity. Nevertheless, it
noted that federal and state legislators generally have been accorded the
same scope of legislative immunity.138 Thus, the Court declared, state
legislators are immune from injunctive suits 139 and, therefore, so were
135 446 U.S. at 731-33. Because federal and state legislators follow similar procedures,
federal court review presents a similar threat of disruption to each. See note 14 and accompa-
nying text supra.
136 On this tier, the standards applicable to interference with federal and state legislative
activity differ because of the difference between the requirements of federalism and separa-
tion of powers doctrine. The Court determined the effect of separation of powers doctrine
upon federal courts' power to enjoin members of Congress in Eastland v. United States Ser-
vicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), see notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra, but has
yet to rule on the effect of federalism upon federal courts' power to enjoin state legislators.
137 See 446 U.S. at 733. Although federalism does not bar a federal criminal prosecution
of a state legislator, the separation of powers doctrine does bar a federal criminal prosecution
of a member of Congress. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980); note 59 and
accompanying text supra.
138 446 U.S. at 733. The Court's failure to articulate the standard it applied in determin-
ing that federal court interference was unacceptable left the scope of the state legislator's
immunity from federal court proceedings uncertain. This confusion can only lead to more
litigation of similar claims. Such litigation will not only burden the federal court docket, but
will pose an additional threat to the independence of state legislators as well. Until the Court
articulates a coherent standard for analyzing immunity claims, state legislators will be bur-
dened with the defense of these claims and influenced by the threat of possible liability.
139 The Court stated that if the plaintiffs had sued the Virginia legislature for refusing to
amend the State Bar Code, the defendants would have been accorded legislative immunity.
Id. This is the first case in which the Supreme Court has declared that state legislators enjoy
immunity from injunctive suits. Previously, the circuit courts had divided on this issue. See
notes 53-74 and accompanying text sura.
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the defendants in Consumers Union. 140
The Court failed to articulate a standard for second-tier analysis to
explain this extension of state legislative immunity. Generally, the fed-
eral courts have a duty to provide a means of redressing violations of
constitutional rights.1 41 Constitutional violations by members of Con-
gress are an exception; the doctrine of separation of powers, operating
through the Speech or Debate Clause, prevents federal judicial ac-
tion.' 42 Federalism requires a similar limitation on federal court inter-
ference with state activity, but it will not shield state legislators from
prosecutions for violations of constitutional rights. 143 Second-tier analy-
sis ensures that federal courts protect constitutional rights, but limits
federal court interference in other governmental activity. These are the
same concerns that led the Supreme Court, through the Younger doc-
trine, to bar federal courts from enjoining alleged state violations of con-
stitutional rights when an adequate state forum exists. 144
140 446 U.S. at 738.
141 See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
142 See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
143 See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980) and notes 58-64 and accompanying
text supra.
144 See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra. The Younger standards are not the only
issues that face a court considering a request for an injunction against state legislative activi-
ties. Even if a plaintiff meets the Younger standards, principles of federalism may bar a federal
court from issuing an injunction the terms of which will create an extensive and continuing
intrusion into the state's legislative activity and thereby threaten the state's sovereignty. In
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), supra note 33, the Court indicated its unwillingness to
sustain a federal court order that had directed local officials to institute a detailed plan for
handling police misconduct grievances. In Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), the
Court overturned a lower court desegregation order which provided extensive directions for
local school board officials on mundane administrative matters. These decisions represent a
recognition of the federalism issues raised by extensive entanglement of a federal court in the
day-to-day affairs of local officials.
A similar problem might arise where an injunction against a state legislature creates a
substantial restraint on legislative conduct. Consider a situation in which a state legislator,
concerned with the effect of auto imports on the state's auto industry, introduces a bill to bar
imported autos from the state's highways. The foreign manufacturer then seeks an injunction
in federal court to bar scheduled hearings. The manufacturer satisfies the Younger require-
ments, demonstrating that the hearings will reduce the sales of imported autos even if the
legislature takes no further action on the bill.
The injunction request presents the federal court with a dilemma. If the court grants the
injunction, it will have protected the manufacturer's constitutional rights at the cost of limit-
ing the state legislature's power to control its own agenda--a substantial infringement on
state sovereignty. Alternatively, if the court denies the injunction, it will have preserved state
sovereignty at the cost of allowing the state to violate a citizen's constitutional rights.
No legal standard provides an adequate guide for a court confronted with this dilemma.
Essentially, the court must weigh the equities in each case. The court might consider the
nature and extent of the injury threatened to the plaintiff and the plaintiff's ability to limit its
injury. The court might also consider the history of similar legislative activities and the legis-
lature's "good faith" in scheduling the hearings. Except in the unusual case of limited harm
to the plaintiff and a substantial infringement on legislative prerogative, the federal court
should issue the injunction, taking care to frame its terms as narrowly as possible.
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Jordan v. Hutcheson 145 illustrates the threat that absolute state legisla-
tive immunity would pose to federal courts' capacity to redress state vio-
lations of constitutional rights. In Jordan, a case decided seven years
before Younger, the plaintiffs alleged that the state legislature had con-
ducted a continuing investigation of their activities for the purpose of
harassing them "in their efforts as lawyers to serve the cause of desegre-
gation."' 146 The Fourth Circuit determined that an injunction against
the state legislature was appropriate. 147 In this situation, the Younger
standards would have provided similar protection from state violation of
constitutional rights. Younger bars a federal court injunction against
pending state criminal proceedings unless the plaintiff demonstrates
great and immediate irreparable harm. 148 The facts ofJordan indicate
that the legislature's investigation caused substantial and continuing
damage to the plaintiffs. 149 Because the investigation involved only leg-
islative activity, an injunction against the legislature was the only means
of protecting the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 150 Thus, the Younger
standards would permit a federal court to issue an injunction against the
legislature when no other process could protect sufficiently the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights. 15 1
Application of the Younger standards to Consumers Union reveals the
strength of the defendants' arguments for legislative immunity from in-
junction in that case. 152 The "great and immediate irreparable harm"
required under Younger for an injunction to issue is absent. The. threat of
future prosecutions under the relevant regulation of the Code seems
145 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963); see notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
146 323 F.2d at 599.
147 Id. at 601. In Consumers Union, the Court implied that the Fourth Circuit position
presented injordan--that legislative immunity does not bar injunctive suits against state legis-
lators-is no longer valid. 446 U.S. at 732 n.10. This is becauseJordan was decided before the
Supreme Court held in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975),
that members of Congress are immune from injunctive suits. The Supreme Court suggested
in Consumers Union that this same immunity should extend to state legislators. Set note 122
supra.
148 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971); see notes 31-32 and accompanying text
supra.
149 See 323 F.2d at 602-04.
150 InJordan, the legislative activity directly interfered with the plaintiffs' constitutional
rights. The federal court did not have the option of issuing an injunction against non-legisla-
tive officials to protect the plaintiffs' rights.
151 Leaving aside the question of sufficient harm to warrant issuance of an injunction, the
availability of alternative relief would bar a federal court injunction under Younger. Thus, the
Younger standards would not support issuance of a federal court injunction in Star Distribs.,
Ltd. v. Marino, 613 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1980), see notes 70-74 and accompanying text supra,
because the plaintiff could have ignored the subpoena and raised its constitutional claim in a
contempt proceeding. 613 F.2d at 7-8 & n.8.
152 Younger created a presumption against the issuance of federal court injunctive relief.
See text accompanying note 30 supra. Consequently, a plaintiff seeking a federal court injunc-
tion under Younger must present a strong case for federal intervention:
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largely hypothetical in Consumers Union. 153 Moreover, the availability of
injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the regulation provides an
alternative and less intrusive means of protecting the plaintiffs constitu-
tional rights than does an injunction against legislative activity.' 54
B. Judicial Immunity from Injunctive Suits
The Court in Consumers Union noted that the circuit courts are di-
vided on the issue of whether judicial immunity bars injunctive relief,1 5 5
but determined that it was unnecessary to resolve the issue in this
case. 156 Dicta in the Court's opinion, however, suggest that state judi-
cial activity in an area of inherent judicial authority justifies immunity
from federal court injunction. 15 7 If the threat of interference with the
exercise of inherent judicial authority in the area of rulemaking justifies
immunity from injunctions, then other judicial activities, such as adjudi-
cation, would seem to deserve similar immunity. 158 As the judicial im-
munity cases have indicated, the threat of interference in the area of
adjudication is especially great because of the need for integrity in adju-
dication and the dangers of undue influence in an area of close decision-
making.1 59 If interference with judicial rulemaking independently
requires immunity from injunctions, then adjudication deserves at least
the same protection.
The availability of appellate review generally will remove any
threat to constitutional rights posed by official immunity, 160 but some
threats will require other remedies. 16 1 In these situations, absolute im-
munity would prevent federal enforcement of constitutional rights. Fed-
eral courts might avoid this result in either of two ways. Future
decisions might honor the limited nature of the Consumers Union holding
153 The State Bar Association had expressed its belief that the regulation was
unconstitutional.
154 The injunction against enforcement of the regulation removed the threat to constitu-
tional rights without disturbing the state's legislative processes.
155 446 U.S. at 735. Se notes 86-89 and accompanying text supra.
156 446 U.S. at 736. The Court noted that because the defendants were properly held
liable in their enforcement capacities, there was no need to decide whether they were immune
in their judicial capacities.
157 See notes 132-34 and accompanying text supra.
158 Neither the Supreme Court nor the courts of appeals have reached this result when
addresing this issue. See notes 86-89 and accompanying text supra.
159 See notes 79-80 and accompanying text sura. Federal court interference with adjudi-
cation poses a greater threat of undue influence than does federal court interference with
judicial rulemaking. The general application of rules assures the interest and involvement of
many elements of the community in the rulemaking process. The influence of these groups
will serve to diminish the influence of a federal judge on the legislative process. Adjudication,
on the other hand, takes place in a relative vacuum. Generally, only the parties to the suit
have a substantial interest in the outcome. Without these countervailing forces, a federal
judge may exercise a greater influence on the outcome of the adjudication.
160 See notes 81-85 and accompanying text supra.
161 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); note 32 supra.
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by extending immunity only in cases in which a court concomitantly
exercises inherent judicial authority and substantial rulemaking
power. 162 Alternatively, federal courts might apply the Younger stan-
dards to determine when they have authority to enjoin state judicial
activity. 163 Consumers Union is not a strong case for issuing an injunction
under the Younger standards.'6 In a case in which a plaintiff is suffering
actual harm and has no other remedy, however, a federal court injunc-
tion might be justified despite the state's substantial interest in the inde-
pendence of its judicial proceedings. 165
C. Executive Immunity for Rulemaking
Consumers Union may imply an expansion of immunity in the execu-
tive branch as well. 166 Viewed under the functional approach to official
immunity, the decision suggests that defendants' immunity was trig-
gered by their exercise of substantial rulemaking authority. 167 Under
this functional analysis, a wide range of state and federal executive offi-
cials with delegated rulemaking responsibilities arguably could qualify
for absolute legislative immunity.168 This would mark a major depar-
162 It is not apparent why these two factors, each by itself inadequate to bar a federal
court injunction, would, when brought together, bar the exercise of federal judicial power.
Regardless of this conceptual problem, courts might adopt this approach to avoid some of the
practical consequences of reading the decision too broadly.
163 For a discussion of the Younger standards, see notes 31-33 and accompanying text
supra. The relevant inquiry in determining federal courts' authority to review state judicial
activity focuses on the requirement of preserving state sovereignty. The Younger doctrine de-
veloped primarily in response to the needs of state sovereignty and federalism. Factors such
as exercise of substantial rulemaking authority or inherent judicial power, while coinciding
with important attributes of state sovereignty, relate only indirectly to the issue of sover-
eignty. The Court's emphasis on these factors serves to deflect its inquiry from the central
issue of sovereignty.
164 See notes 153-54 and accompanying text supra.
165 See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
166 Two considerations make executive immunity particularly important. First, since Er
piarle Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the primary method for challenging state laws has been
suits for injunctions against the responsible executive officials. L. TRIBE, supra note 64, § 3-38.
In Consumers Union, plaintiffs sought and received an injunction against the appropriate execu-
tive officials. 446 U.S. at 727. Second, executive action is often the final step in any govern-
mental action. If executive officials are immune from judicial proceedings, the injured
persons may get no opportunity to challenge the underlying authority for the executive
action.
167 See notes 104-10 and accompanying text supra. The Court based its grant of immu-
nity on the state court's inherent judicial power to regulate the Bar as well as the legislative
delegation of rulemaking authority to the state court. 446 U.S. at 734. The Court failed to
specify, however, whether either justification standing alone would be a sufficient basis for
immunity. See notes 132-34 and accompanying text supra. This leaves open the possibility
that in future cases a simple exercise of rulemaking authority will be a sufficient justification
for immunity. If courts narrowly interpret Consumers Union, however, they will require both a
legislative delegation of rulemaking authority and inherent judicial authority before they will
grant immunity.
168 Numerous executive officials exercise some measure of delegated legislative authority.
See, e.g., VA. CODE § 10-186 (1950) (duties of the Council on the Environment); id. § 12.1-12
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ture from the Court's holdings in Butz and Scheuer limiting such officials
to a qualified immunity defense for claims arising from their discretion-
ary activities. 169
CONCLUSION
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.
reflects the Supreme Court's continuing uncertainty as to the scope of
suggested official immunity. By failing to consider the constitutional
roots of official immunity, the Court suggested several improper exten-
sions of this doctrine. Uhder the suggested approach, the Court would
have recognized the dissimilar requirements of judicial deference im-
posed by the separation of powers doctrine and federalism. Unlike sepa-
ration of powers doctrine, federalism does not always require judicial
deference in cases involving threats to constitutionally guaranteed
rights. The Younger doctrine suggests a useful standard for determining
when interests of comity should yield to federal courts' responsibility to
protect constitutional rights.
Consumers Union's discussion of legislative immunity is subject to a
range of interpretations. At most, it stands for the proposition that state
legislative immunity is virtually equal to congressional immunity. At
the least, it stands for the proposition that state legislators are immune
from federal court injunctions when federally guaranteed rights are only
theoretically implicated. Application of the Younger standards in future
cases will return legislative immunity to its constitutional roots and pro-
vide a coherent standard for deciding these cases.
Depending on the relationship between the two factors underlying
the Court's decision to extend legislative immunity to state court
judges-the Virginia Court's exercise of inherent judicial authority as
well as its rulemaking power-the Court's reasoning might be applied to
extend absolute immunity to a wide range of executive and judicial
functions. Because this extension would ignore constitutional limits to
judicial deference, courts should interpret the decision narrowly.
Stuar/j. Bassin
(duties of the State Corporation Commission); id. § 63.1-25 (rulemaking power of the State
Board of Welfare). The enabling statute carefully circumscribes the area of the Virginia
Court's authority. For example, the Virginia Court could not allow first or second year law
students to engage in the practice of law. See id. § 54-48.
169 See notes 90-103 and accompanying text supra. In Consumers Union, the Court ex-
pressly held the defendant judges liable in their enforcement capacities, 446 U.S. at 736, just
as other executive officials are liable in their enforcement capacities. Id. Therefore, the only
implications of an expansion of immunity under the functional approach would be in the
class of executive officials amenable to suit. Although expanded immunity would shield those
officials exercising rulemaking responsibilities, these same officials might be liable in their
enforcement capacities.
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